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Study
REINVENTING THE REGULATORY AGENDA. CONCLUSIONS




As part of its rulemaking process, the United States Environmen-
tal Protecting Agency (EPA) is required by executive order and statute
to publish rulemaking progress projections twice yearly in the
Regulatory Agenda (Agenda).' Federal Regulations describe this
Agenda as a "summary of current and projected rulemakings, reviews
of existing regulations, and Agency actions completed since the
previous publication of the [A]genda."2 The Agenda lists the major
actions that have been planned, are underway, or have been complet-
ed under each statute that EPA administers.3 Most significantly, the
Agenda provides EPA's projected Federal Register publication dates
of Notice of Proposed Rulemakings (NPRMs) and Final Rules.
Currently, these timetables are of limited value to the public or other
parties interested in participating in the rulemaking process because
EPA consistently misses these dates. This Study presents the findings
of, and draws conclusions from, an empirical study of the publication
estimates that EPA has published in the Agenda for its Clean Air Act
(CAA) rulemakings. The Study documents the extent to which EPA
met these deadlines, identifies various possible causes for the
documented regulatory delay, and suggests a method for transforming
the Agenda into an effective quality management tool for improving
and expediting the rulemaking process.
* B.A., B.S.M.E., 1990, Rice University. J.D., 1994, University of Maryland School of
Law. M.S.E., 1994, Johns Hopkins University, Department of Geography and
Environmental Engineering.
1. The Agenda reporting requirements apply to all agencies of the federal
government, 5 U.S.C. § 602 (1988), but this analysis focuses solely on EPA.
2. 57 Fed. Reg. 52,024 (1992).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 602 (1988).
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The results of this Study can be applied in two ways. First, they
serve as a rough "user's guide" to the Agenda-specifically to its Clean
Air Act section. Currently, the Agenda provides the only readily
accessible source of rulemaking scheduling information. For
members of the general public not "plugged in" to regulatory circles,
probing the bureaucracy for the status of even a single rulemaking
can be a resource-intensive endeavor beyond the patience and means
of many.' This Study attempts to place the Agenda's information in
perspective in order to improve its utility.
Second, this Study's results reveal the pervasive acceptance of
unrealistic rulemaking targets by EPA, the President, and Congress.
Chronic regulatory delay and unrealistic Agenda information are
symptoms of complex problems in the regulatory bureaucracy. By
publishing consistently inaccurate dates in the guise of reliable
estimates, EPA has imposed a veil of deception over the rulemaking
process that not only impairs public and private participation, but
creates needless public mistrust of the regulatory system.
An improved Agenda would serve as a useful information
disclosure document and measurement tool. It could help to explain
and improve the administrative rulemaking process and mitigate
delays. Currently, no EPA document compiles information sufficient
to hold any of the players accountable for the delays routinely
experienced. As accountability is obscured, so are solutions to
persistent problems that perpetuate administrative ineffectiveness. As
the executive branch proceeds with its heralded campaign to
"Reinvent Government,"5 demands for greater accountability through
information disclosure should become an attainable goal. The
Agenda could be modified into a powerful quality management6 tool,
providing a reliable means of performance measurement to guide
improvement of the administrative process.
The publication of this Study's empirical data generates questions
not adequately answerable through the summary information
provided in EPA's Agenda. To account for the many conceivable
causes of missed target dates and deadlines, EPA must more realisti-
4. Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test
of Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113, 122 (1992) (analyzing rulemaking delay
through the study of data attained through Freedom of Information Act requests).
5. "Reinventing Government" is the unofficial term for Vice President Gore's National
Performance Review initiative, a government reform initiative aimed at reducing
government waste and delay. See generally NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: FROM RED
TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND CosTs LESS (1993)
[hereinafter NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW].
6. See infra notes 153-162 and accompanying text.
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cally assess its rulemaking process. The Study does not purport to
reach conclusions about EPA's internal procedures or the greater
environmental political arena. Instead, it seeks to demonstrate the
need for accurate information with regard to EPA rulemaking. It
focuses on the Agenda's potential for use as a public information
disclosure document. Part I traces the historical evolution and
purposes behind the Regulatory Agenda; Part II describes the study
and summarizes its particularly pertinent findings; Part III identifies
the systemic causes of regulatory delay; and finally, Part IV describes
the Agenda's role in sustaining bureaucratic delay and discusses the
possibility of its reform. A summary of the complete results of the
Study is included in an appendix. This Study exposes the limited
utility of the information currently provided in the Agenda, but
concludes that the Agenda could be transformed from a semi-annual
bureaucratic ritual into a beneficial measurement tool.
I. EVOLUTION AND PURPOSE OF THE REGULATORY AGENDA
The Regulatory Agenda has been published in its present form
since 1980. It was shaped by a Carter Administration Executive
Order,7 a federal statute which partially codified the Order,' and a
Reagan Administration Executive Order that modified the require-
ments of the statute.9 These reforms reflected a growing perception
that the federal bureaucracy was becoming unwieldy. The Carter
Administration's primary concern was for efficiency and equity in the
administration of the burgeoning federal regulatory system vis-a-vis the
public.'0  Congress and the Reagan Administration shifted the
emphasis towards efficiency and equity with regard to small businesses
and organizations." The Agenda was to provide interested parties
with the advance notice necessary for public oversight of regulatory
activities. 12  Contemporaneously, executive, congressional, and
judicial oversight were competing to influence the rulemaking
process.13
President Carter initiated the publication of a "Semiannual
Agenda of Regulations" with Executive Order 12,044 in 1978.' 4 In
7. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
8. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1988).
9. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
10. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
11. See 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
12. See id. § 602.
13. See id, §§ 601-612.
14. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
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general, the Order emphasized the adoption of "procedures to
improve existing and future regulations."1 5 The economy, individu-
als, public and private organizations, and state and local governments
were to be spared unnecessary burdens.16 Section 1(c) stated that
the efficient regulatory process must ensure the opportunity for "early
participation and comment" by agencies, governments, businesses,
organizations, as well as individual citizens.17
The first of five procedural reforms contained in the Order was
the requirement that a Semiannual Agenda of Regulations be
published "[t]o give the public adequate notice . . . of significant
regulations under development or review.""8 Rulemaking schedules
per se were not required; information describing and noting the
status of an agency action was sufficient. 9 The publication require-
ment was limited to "significant regulations," which were to be
identified through criteria established by each agency based on the
burdens and effects of the regulations on individuals, state and local
governments, and businesses and organizations. 20
While Executive Order 12,044 was still in effect, Congress passed
the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) in September of 1980.21 The




18. Id. The other four specific reforms contained in the Order included: (1) agency
head oversight of significant regulations; (2) opportunity for public participation through
a variety of means including publication of advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, open
conferences and public hearings, media publication, and direct notification; (3) approval
of significant regulations by agency heads before comment is solicited; and (4) specific
criteria for determining whether a regulation is significant. Id. Section 3 also required
the preparation of a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for significant new regulations. Id.
19. See id
At a minimum, each published agenda shall describe the regulations being
considered by the agency, the need for and legal basis for the action being taken,
and the status of regulations previously listed on the agenda. Each item on the
agenda shall also include the name and telephone number of a knowledgeable
agency official and, if possible, state whether or not a regulatory analysis will be
required.
Id.
20. Id. According to § 2(e) of Executive Order 12,044, the criteria for determining
significant regulations included: "(1) the type and number of individuals, businesses,
organizations, State and local governments affected; (2) the compliance and reporting
requirements likely to be involved; (3) direct and indirect effects of the regulation
including the effect on competition; and (4) the relationship of the regulations to those
of other programs and agencies." Id.
21. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1980).
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were to publish Agendas each year.22 It also made the Agenda
publication requirement applicable only to rules "likely to have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,"
rather than on the range of entities included in the Carter Order.23
For applicable rulemakings, the information requirements were
similar to, although more specific than, those in Executive Order
12,044. A significant additional requirement was the mandate to
include an "approximate schedule" for completing the action.24
The RFA focused on the impacts of regulation on small business-
es and organizations.25 It required that a copy of each Agenda be
transmitted to the Chief Counsel of the Small Business Administration
for comment.26 In addition, the RFA required each agency to issue
both notice of the Agenda and a solicitation of comments to the
community of "small entities. "27
Although the language of the RFA is aimed at small business
entities, its legislative history reflects a continued interest on the part
of Congress in achieving Executive Order 12,044's goal of broad
participation in the regulatory process:
The purpose of the "Regulatory Flexibility Act" is to encour-
age federal agencies to utilize innovative administrative
procedures in dealing with individuals, small businesses,
small organizations, and small governmental bodies that
would otherwise be unnecessarily adversely affected by
federal regulations .... This is a goal President Carter has
also called for in his Executive Order on Improving Govern-
ment Regulations (Executive Order 12,044).28
In fact, the legislative history indicates that the public participation
provisions of Executive Order 12,044 were actually narrower than
those of the RFA:'
[T]he committee believes that S. 299 [the Senate bill which
was ultimately ratified] would not conflict with the Executive
22. Id, § 602(a).
23. I § 601(a)(1) (emphasis added).
24. Id. § 602(c) (2). Specifically, the RFA required the Agenda to contain a description
of the rule's subject area, a summary of the nature of the rulemaking, its objectives and
legal basis, an agency contact name and phone number, and an "approximate schedule
for completing action on any rule for which the agency has issued a general notice of
proposed rulemaking." Id. § 602(a).
25. See id §§ 601-612.
26. IdM § 602(b).
27. Id § 602(c).




Order and does not represent a duplication of objectives. S.
299 would supplement and strengthen the Order in several
ways, notably by improving public participation and providing
for the assessment of alternative regulatory strategies in light
of their impact on small concerns.
°
On its face, the RFA's notice requirement is merely a courtesy to
small businesses. Since no independent purpose was given for the
publication requirement, it may be inferred that publication was
designed to facilitate the achievement of the broader goals of the
RFA. Under the Act, the listing of an item in the Agenda neither
restricts nor mandates agency action.31 This lack of obligation,
combined with subsection (a)(2)'s soft requirement to provide an
"approximate schedule," provides no inherent credibility to the dates
listed.32  For any rulemaking which does not have a significant
impact on "small entities," the publication of even an approximate
schedule is completely voluntary.
Although President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291 specifically
revoked Executive Order 12,044,"3 the Regulatory Flexibility Act and
its incorporation of the goals of Executive Order 12,044 remain in
effect. Moreover, Executive Order 12,291 expanded the types of
rulemakings covered under the limited RFA agenda requirement to
include "proposed regulations that the agency has issued or expects
to issue." 4 The Order provides that adhering to the general RFA
agenda requirements would satisfy its mandate, 5 but requires that
a broader range of agency activities, including existing agency regula-
tions, be listed.36 The schedules remain approximations,37 and the
Order expressly precludes the creation of legally enforceable rights in
its contents.3 8
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1988). "Nothing in this section precludes an agency from
considering or acting on any matter not included in a regulatory flexibility agenda, or
requires an agency to consider or act on any matter listed in such agenda." Id.
32. Id. § 602(a) (2) (1988) (emphasis added).
33. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601.
34. Id. The most significant aspect of Executive Order 12,291 is its requirement that
a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) be prepared for each proposed "major rule." An RIA
is essentially a cost-benefit analysis that emphasizes the burden of the economic costs of
regulation. A "major rule" is defined with respect to economic impacts as any rule likely
to have "an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more." Id. § 1 (b)(1).
35. Id. § 5(a).
36. id § 5.
37. Id. § 5(a)(1).
38. Id. § 9 ("This Order is intended only to improve the internal management of the
Federal government, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or
526 [VOL. 53:521
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The existence of other legally enforceable rights associated with
the information in the Agenda is uncertain. To date, there are no
reported judicial decisions concerning government liability for
information in the Agenda. The President can make compliance with
the mandates of an Executive Order expressly unenforceable by the
public, as can Congress by statute. A private party, however, could
potentially seek a judicial remedy for an action taken in reliance on
the official Agenda estimates published in the Federal Register. It is
conceivable, for example, that a business or public interest group
whose interests have been compromised could make a colorable argu-
ment.39 But the potential value of the Agenda is not related to
justifying questionable litigation. Instead, it is related to participation
in administrative rulemaking and efficient management of the
rulemaking process.
Because the Agenda publication requirement is the product of an
executive order in which no express legal rights are conferred on the
public, the practical value of the Agenda's information is best
reflected in agency interpretation and practice since its inception.
The Regulatory Agenda Notice section of the November 1992 Agenda
states EPA's interpretation of the Agenda's purpose:
By providing the public with current and advance informa-
tion about pending regulatory activities, the Agency hopes to
encourage more effective public participation in the
regulatory process.. . . The Agency has attempted to list all
regulations and regulatory reviews except those considered
as minor, routine, or repetitive actions. There is no legal
significance to the inadvertent omission of an item from the
listing. The Agenda reflects dates for actions on each item;
these dates are honest estimates but should not be construed
as an Agency commitment to act on or by the date shown.4 °
According to both executive order and statute, the information
in the Agenda is intended to provide useful information for the
procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers
or any person.").
39. A simplified example might involve a small business that decides to forego
installation of emissions recovery equipment with a three year return on investment in
reasonable reliance upon Agenda projections that a new rule affecting such projects,
mandating an as yet undetermined standard will be promulgated within three years. If the
rule is published several years late, the business might be able to claim lost profits incurred
from foregoing the modification in reliance on EPA's estimates. A court could find that
EPA should have reasonably expected affected parties to take such action in reliance on
the official Federal Register publication.
40. 57 Fed. Reg. 52,024 (1992).
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regulated community as well as for the general public. While "honest
estimates" regarding deadlines are all that can be realistically expected
from EPA, the empirical data in this Study suggest honesty has
become a forgotten standard.
II. SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
A. Description of the Database
The Study is based on data on informal rulemakings41 taken
from the Clean Air Act (CAA) section of the seven Agendas published
for the three-year period from October 1989 through October 1992.
The CAA section was chosen because the Office of Air and Radiation,
which implements the CAA, has been one of the most prolific EPA
rulemaking offices. Three years of Agenda information provided a
sufficiently large, yet manageable amount of data for a preliminary
study. These three years of implementation of the CAA are an
especially significant period in the evolution of the administration of
environmental law. During that time, EPA grappled with the
tremendous requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA),
enacted November 15, 1990.42 The data reflects one year of relative
calm before the enactment of the CAAA and two years of preparation
and implementation of its requirements.
B. Empirical Results
The following summary of empirical results demonstrates the
predictable inaccuracy of information in the Agenda as well as the
existence of more pervasive problems in the rulemaking process.
More detailed results of the Study, including analyses of additional
parameters, appear in the appendix.
The Agenda gives estimated publication dates for NPRMs4 3 and
final rules. 44 This Study reveals that these publication dates are
unlikely to be honored. With regard to NPRMs, EPA revised over
eighty percent of all estimates for NPRM publication. 45 The revised
publication dates were on average almost six months later than the
41. Informal rulemakings are agency actions subject to the normal notice and
comment rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1988).
42. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
43. 57 Fed. Reg. 52,024 (1992).
44. Id
45. App. Part I.A.I.
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previous publication dates.46 Moreover, EPA failed to meet eighty-six
percent of all estimated NPRM publication dates.47 On average, EPA
missed the dates by almost five months.'
EPA's estimated dates for publishing final rules were just as
unreliable as those for NPRMs, even though rules at this stage are
more mature and their futures presumably more predictable. EPA
revised over eighty percent of all estimates for final rule publica-
tion.49 The revised publication dates were on average almost six
months later than the previous publication dates.50 On average, EPA
missed the dates by nearly four months.51
The findings also demonstrate that congressional reliance on
statutory deadlines as a means of controlling rulemaking priority is
ineffective. Forty-four percent of the rulemakings were subject to
such deadlines, but their publication dates were postponed and
missed about as frequently as the publication dates for rulemakings
without deadlines.
EPA must acknowledge that the dates listed for the vast majority
of rulemakings in any given Agenda are not realistic estimates. Given
that listing unrealistic target dates has been ineffective in stimulating
expedited rulemaking, EPA must undertake to produce more reliable
Agendas that might at least function as useful information disclosure
documents and measurement tools.
III. SYSTEMIC CAUSES OF REGULATORY DELAY
This Study quantifies what those involved with rulemaking have
recognized for years: "the rulemaking process has become increasing-




49. App. Part I.A.2.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTEE ON RULEMAKING,
IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR AGENCY RULEMAKING 1 (1993) [hereinafter ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CONFERENCE]. In another study, Professor Jerry L. Mashaw viewed this common
perception as one of the assumptions underlying administrative failure. He "indulge[d]
the view that rulemaking is currently so difficult and time-consuming that agencies fail to
accomplish missions (either of a regulatory or deregulatory sort) that are worth doing."
JERRY L. MASHAW, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPROVING THE
ENVIRONMENT OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN ESSAY ON MANAGEMENT, GAMES, AND LEGAL
AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (1993). See also Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 4, at 115
(describing regulatory delay as "staggering" and "a fundamental impediment to the
functioning of regulatory agencies").
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can be attributed both to internal factors in EPA's structure and
management and to external factors such as executive, congressional,
and judicial oversight. 3 Although the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) outlines a clear scheme for expeditious informal rule-
making,54 its simplicity has become obscured by the continual and
often competing influences of all three branches of the federal
government.55 This additional complexity has led many commenta-
tors to question the purported superiority of the APA rulemaking
process as it is now practiced over the case-by-case adjudication that
it supplanted in most agencies. 56 The literature thoroughly explores
potential causes of the pervasive delay. Professor Jerry L. Mashaw, for
example, described a recent issue of Law and Contemporary Problems,
critiquing EPA's performance after twenty years, as "a 374-page orgy
of hand-wringing concerning EPA's rulemaking performance."57
This Part of the Study discusses the principal sources of regulatory
delay, focusing on the effect that executive, congressional, and judicial
branch oversight has on internal agency practices. The following
discussion is intended to place the problem in perspective. The
available data on regulatory delay is insufficient to merit further
theorizing beyond the current literature; rather it highlights the need
for a unified approach.
53. MASHAW, supra note 52, at 2. In his study, Professor Mashaw stated that "the
rulemaking process in all administrative agencies is shaped by the interaction of the
agency's internal and external environment." Id. For his analysis, Mashaw assumed that
the external environment dominates this relationship. I& He qualified this assumption
by noting that it is controversial. Id,
54. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). The APA requirements include public notice of proposed
rulemakings and an opportunity to submit comments that the agency must consider.
(2) (b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register ....
(2) (c) After notice .... the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity
to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration
of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.
Id
55. Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying'the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1385, 1396-98 (1992). Professor McGarity attributes the complexity of the rulemaking
process to four factors: (1) the notice and comment procedure has worked so well that
factions are able to mobilize; (2) informal rulemaking has developed during a period of
intense competition between Congress and the President for control of policy; (3) the
modern complexity of rulemaking has grown beyond the resources of agencies to apply
their expertise; and (4) the informal rulemaking process has developed during a period
of intense public distrust. It at 1397-98.
56. See id. at 1398.
57. MASHAW, supra note 52, at 8.
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A. Executive Branch Review
Although executive review in some form is essential for coordi-
nating the vast federal environmental rulemaking structure, the
current process of review has been criticized for its secrecy and
potential to displace agency authority.58 Currently, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) functions as the primary executive
oversight apparatus in the rulemaking process.59 OMB derives its
rulemaking authority from two principal executive orders: Executive
Order 12,291 requires EPA to submit proposed rules to OMB for
approval;' Executive Order 12,498 requires EPA to submit the
annual regulatory program to OMB for its supervision.6 1 These
orders were intended
to ensure consistency and coordination of the regulatory
process, to increase the authority of agency heads over their
staffs by bringing matters to political attention at an early
stage, to ensure that the regulatory program is both subject
to public scrutiny and conducted consistently with the
political objectives of the administration, and to promote
political accountability over the regulatory process by
increasing the power of those close to the President.
62
In practice, these Executive Orders function as an awesome
source of power for OMB to modify or supplant EPA's regulatory
priorities and force changes in the regulations.63 University of
Chicago Law Professor Cass Sunstein believes that although OMB
review is capable of addressing some systemic problems in the
regulatory structure, it may increase the "power of private groups with
disproportionate access to OMB officials." 6' As one congressional
staffer explained: "[R] egulatory review has 'provided industry with an
opportunity to review, comment on, delay, and change EPA actions
behind closed doors. The public has not been afforded this opportu-
nity and consequently faces industry-influenced and weakened
58. See generally Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of
the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (Autumn 1991).
59. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 § 6 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601.
60. Id.
61. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985).
62. Cass Sunstein, Factions, Self-interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L.
REV. 271, 294 (1986).
63. Clean Air Act Implementation (Part 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 328 (1991)
[hereinafter Hearings (Part 2)] (testimony of Professor Robert V. Percival).
64. Sunstein, supra note 62, at 294.
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guidelines, regulations, and standards difficult to modify."' 65 This
lack of public accountability "may also increase rather than diminish
the dangers of self-interested representation and factional tyranny."66
Even benign OMB review adds time to the rulemaking process.67
According to Professor Mashaw, the effect of executive/OMB
oversight amounts simply to "delays and displacements."' Moreover,
OMB priorities may conflict with those of EPA, resulting in slow
review of the rulemakings that EPA considers high priority. Case
histories of OMB-derived delay in the rulemaking process are well
documented.69 EPA estimated the OMB component of rulemaking
delay to be 50 to 100 days per regulation in 1984 and 1985.70 OMB's
power to kill rulemakings through delay has led critics to label the
review process a "black hole."71
Another problem with executive oversight is its timing. Identify-
ing problems late in the rulemaking process necessarily causes greater
delays than if problems were discovered at an early stage. The
Administrative Conference of the United States has recommended
that agencies involve executive oversight bodies early in the rule-
making process to more effectively coordinate the comment process
and expedite final executive review.72  Professor Sunstein has
recommended that a deadline be included in the review process to
confront the history of delay.73
65. Percival, supra note 58, at 170 (quoting Office of Management and Budget Plays Critical
Part in Environmental Policymaking Faces Little External Review, 7 Env't Rep. (BNA) 693, 695
(1976)). The current criticism of regulatory review has become even more polar and
rhetorical. Congressman Waxman made the following comment in an oversight hearing
regarding former Vice President Quayle's Council on Competitiveness: "In many ways, the
council, which apparently thinks itself beyond public accountability and beyond the law
of the land, is a domestic version of the Iran-Contra operations of the National Security
Council during the Reagan era." Hearings (Part 2), supra note 63, at I (testimony of the
Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health and the Environment).
Congressman Sikorski referred to the council as a "special secret court for special
interests." Id. at 11 (testimony of Mr. Sikorski).
66. Sunstein, supra note 62, at 294.
67. ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY STUDY INSTITUTE AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INSTITUTE, STATUTORY DEADLINES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION: NECESSARY BUT NEED
IMPROVEMENT 32 (1985) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY].
68. MASHAW, supra note 52, at 20.
69. See Percival, supra note 58, at 157. Professor Percival has noted that the "'clearest
impact of the regulatory management process has apparently been in slowing down
rulemaking activity.'" Id. (quoting NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,
PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING IN REGULATORY AGENCIES 7 (1987)).
70. Id. at 158.
71. McGarity, supra note 55, at 1431.
72. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE, supra note 52, at 8.
73. Hearings (Part 2), supra note 63, at 293 (testimony of Prof. Cass R. Sunstein).
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The substance of executive oversight extends well beyond the
cost-benefit analysis required by Executive Order 12291. Rulemakers
must assess a proposed regulation's impacts on trade, federalism, and
family values.74  In addition, a separate analysis must consider
whether the proposed regulatory burdens potentially violate the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 75 These reporting require-
ments often displace EPA resources from other priorities. They create
a drain on budget and manpower resources that has translated into
delay and less effective regulations. 76 In fact, the resultant decelera-
tion of the rulemaking process prompted the Administrative Confer-
ence formally to recommend to the President that "[w]hile the
Unified Agenda of Regulations is a useful tool and should be
preserved, the number of extra-APA analytical requirements should
be kept to a minimum." 77
B. Legislative Overburdening
The legislative branch has exerted tremendous pressure on the
rulemaking process that distorts priorities and prevents realistic
agenda setting and deadline compliance.78 Criticism of direct and
74. McGarity, supra note 55, at 1407. Professor McGarity lists the executive branch
requirements beyond the Executive Order 12,291 cost-benefit analysis:
Executive Order 12,291 requires them to analyze the 'trade' impact of regula-
tions; Executive Order 12,612 requires them to analyze the impact of individual
regulations on 'federalism;' and Executive Order 12,606 requires them to
consider 'family' policy making criteria in promulgating regulations ...
However, these requirements have not proven especially burdensome because
they have not been vigorously enforced. Agency officials tend to regard them as
'paperwork' requirements that, although having little or no relevance to the
decisionmaking outcome, bog down the process with additional documents and
intra-agency sign-offs. Although the prospect of preparing . . . federalism
analyses has probably never caused an agency to abandon a rulemaking initiative,
such analyses are nevertheless additional extra-statutory hurdles that burden the
process and inspire rulemaking avoidance techniques.
Id.
75. Id.; Executive Order 12,630.
76. Id at 1406. Average costs during the 1980s were approximately $100,000 and as
high as $2 million. Id.
77. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE, supra note 52, at 3.
78. Professor Percival has capsulized the long standing congressional inertia:
The action-forcing structure of the environmental laws has constrained EPA's
flexibility from the start. Beginning with the Clean Air Act in 1970, statutory
deadlines, technology-forcing regulatory mandates, and citizen suit provisions in
the laws have restricted the agency's ability to decide what to regulate and how
to regulate it. Despite the acknowledged inefficiencies of this approach, its
proponents argued that it was justified on the ground that a national assault on
long-neglected environmental problems had to be jump-started to achieve
success.
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indirect legislative disruption of the rulemaking process includes
complaints of too many requirements in enacted legislation, numer-
ous and unrealistic statutory deadlines attached to those directives,
inadequate funding to meet excessive burdens, and costly and over-
intrusive oversight of implementation. 79  "While overpromising,
underfunding and contributing to analytic overkill in its legislation,
the Congress' oversight activities seem directed primarily at chastising
agencies for the slow pace of their regulatory efforts."80
The complexity of factors and lack of raw data shrouds the true
congressional contribution to delay."' One identifiable factor,
however, stems from the substantive legislative requirements that are
not matched with the budgetary funding necessary for EPA to attend
to its ever-increasing agenda. The statutory deadline is one type of
legislative requirement that stands out from other mandates because
of its seductive simplicity and drastic effect.8 2 While the deadline is
universally recognized as an effective management tool, improper use
and overuse by Congress has nearly destroyed the efficacy of this
legislative tool.83 Although the overuse of deadlines has been
identified as a major obstacle to efficient EPA rulemaking, their use,
as demonstrated by the CAAA,84 has not diminished.85 In fact, the
Administrative Conference of the United States found in 1985 that
"strict legislative time limits on rulemaking, while understandable, ...
have often proven to be unrealistic and have resulted in either hasty
rules or missed deadlines that undermine respect for the rulemaking
process."86
Percival, supra note 58, at 174. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of
Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers
Themselves)?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (Autumn 1991).
79. See generally MASHAW, supra note 52; McGarity, supra note 55.
80. MASHAW, supra note 52, at 22. But Professor McGarity has warned that "[t]he
potency of ad hoc review by interested committees through agency oversight and
appropriations hearings ... should not be understated." McGarity, supra note 55, at 1427.
81. MASHAW, supra note 52, at 51 ("Congress' power to hassle administrators and to
claim credit with constituents for intervening with the bureaucracy is legendary, but there
is virtually no hard data on the degree to which this external political force is a major
impediment to effective rulemaking activity.").
82. The Administrative Conference also has chided Congress for imposing extra-APA
requirements on rulemakers such as the RFA's required analysis of rules' effects on small
businesses. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE, supra note 52, at 4.
83. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY, supra note 67.
84. App. Part I.B.l.
85. Between 1970 and 1980, for example, 328 statutory deadlines appeared in the
enacted federal environmental laws. Id. at 11.
86. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE, supra note 52, at 3-4.
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Despite such cautions from respected government entities,
Congress has either failed to grasp the importance of rationing its use
of deadlines and other mandates or has intentionally continued to
demand more than is possible from an agency whose resources are
already spent.8 7 The CAAA oversight hearings provide a vivid
example of the problem. The CAAA required fifty-five rulemakings
and thirty guidance documents to be promulgated within two
years-an increase by a factor of five over previous air program
activities.a During that period, however, funding for the air pro-
gram increased only sixty-six percent.8 9 Congressman Lent indicated
during a CAAA oversight hearing that congressional willingness to
over-burden EPA stemmed from a lack of trust in the agency's ability
to move forward without the threat of deadlines.90 He described
Congress' motto as "'keep EPA's feet to the fire."'91 Congressman
Bliley, to the contrary, confessed a more basic lack of congressional
understanding:
[W] hile Congress [was] patting itself on the back for a job
well done and enjoying the holidays, our friends at EPA were
left with the almost thankless task of sorting out the thou-
sands of directives and deadlines issued to them by this body
.... I must confess that, during the many hours of debate
and negotiation in Congress, the question, 'How can we
write the bill so that EPA can implement the measures
properly,' was never asked.92
Congressman Bliley's confession was followed by six days of intense
oversight hearings in which Congress consistently attacked EPA and
the executive branch, nit-picking over the accounting of missed
deadlines, but rarely pointing a finger at Congress itself.93
This single set of hearings represents just one example of many
similar hearings to which EPA managers must respond each year.94
87. Professor McGarity, on the other hand, believes that deadlines necessarily force the
process forward. According to his view, "[t]he net result of all the . . . procedural,
analytical, and substantive requirements is a rulemaking process that creeps along, even
when under the pressure of statutory deadlines. In the absence of deadlines, the process
barely moves at all." McGarity, supra note 55, at 1436.
88. Hearings (Part 2), supra note 63, at 13 (testimony of Hon. William K. Reilly,
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency).
89. Id at 72.
90. Id at 518 (testimony of Mr. Lent).
91. Id.
92. Id at 3-4 (testimony of Mr. Bliley).
93. See id
94. Professor Lazarus identified the most remarkable statistic: "From 1971 to 1988,
EPA officials appeared before each Congress between ninety-two and 214 times, testifying
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The fact that eleven House and nine Senate committees with up to
100 combined subcommittees have jurisdiction over EPA demonstrates
the potential for overkill. The tremendous number of oversight
hearings that EPA must prepare for is a severe drain on the Agency's
staff and budget, diverts resources away from the rulemaking process,
and causes further delay.
C. Judicial Review
The judiciary has had significant effects on the rate of develop-
ment of regulations-both directly through the imposition ofjudicial
deadlines and indirectly by affecting the climate of agency rulemaking
through its interpretations of environmental legislation and the APA.
The ability of the courts to destroy years of rulemaking effort through
a single decision has made EPA extremely sensitive to the judicial
process.95 This Study's empirical results indicate greater agency
responsiveness to judicial deadlines than statutory deadlines. 96
Although this resulting disproportionate attention achieves the
immediate goal of expediting the few rulemakings subject to judicial
deadlines, disproportionate costs may result as resources are shifted
away from other agency priorities.97 Thus, judicial action represents
a third often hostile force confronting EPA in its rulemaking activi-
98ties.
The expectation of stringent scrutiny after promulgation of a rule
causes agencies to take a defensive position from the beginning of the
rulemaking process.99 Extra personnel hours and resources are
expended developing ultra-defensible records, and decisionmakers
scrutinize each progressive step of the tortuous process.' °° Rule-
making decisions are not based simply on EPA's fundamental
technical expertise, but also on EPA's perception of the courts' likely
on 142 occasions in the first session of the 101st Congress alone." Lazarus, supra note 78,
at 212.
95. One commentator has concluded simply that "the impact of court decisions on
EPA is problematic. Compliance with court orders has become the agency's top priority,
at times overtaking congressional mandates and threatening representative democracy."
MASHAW, supra note 52, at 18 (quoting Rosemary O'Leary, The Impact of Federal Court
Decisions on the Policies and Administration of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 41
ADMIN. L. REv. 549 (1989)).
96. App. Part I.B.2.
97. MASHAw, supra note 52, at 18.
98. "The evolving scope of judicial review of agency rules, along with the timing of
mostjudicial review of rules at the preenforcement stage, has resulted sometimes in overly
intrusive review." ADMINIsTRATIvE CONFERENCE, supra note 52, at 4.
99. Id.
100. MASHAW, supra note 52, at 19. See also McGarity, supra note 55, at 1387.
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reactions. A history of erratic judicial review of technical issues has
created significant uncertainty within EPA. Because of the complex
and technical nature of many judicial challenges, agencies perceive
the courts as unprepared to issue consistent rulings reflecting the
agencies' technical expertise.'O°
Perhaps the most alarming effect of judicial activity on the
rulemaking process is its pervasive influence on the government, from
legislation through implementation. Shep Melnick's study ofjudicial
review of Clean Air Act rulemakings concluded that courts have a
detrimental effect on the rulemaking process:
Taken as a whole, the consequences of court action under
the Clean Air Act are neither random nor beneficial ....
Court action has encouraged legislators and administrators
to establish goals without considering how they can be
achieved, exacerbating the tendency of these institutions to
promise far more than they can deliver. The policymaking
system of which the federal courts are now an integral part
has produced serious inefficiency and inequities, has made
rational debate and conscious political choice difficult, and
has added to frustration and cynicism among participants of
all stripes.1
02
Moreover, the judiciary can play only a limited role in solving
pervasive problems of the administrative process. 03 As Professor
Sunstein has noted, the drafters of the APA may have believed that
problems in the administrative process "were isolated anomalies
subject to judicial remedy, [but] the most important problems are
structural or systemic in character."'0 4 The inability of the courts to
police the administrative process forces reliance on other means of
supervision. Public scrutiny is one available means of supervision, but
it is only as strong as the amount and quality of the available
information.
101. McGarity, supra note 55, at 1417 (noting that "the fact that nearly all of EPA's first
round [Clean Water Act] ... technology based standards resulted in remands on one or
more technical issues, [which] had a profound impact on the agency").
102. MASHAW, supra note 52, at 18 (citing R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS:
THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR Acr 345 (1983)).
103. See Sunstein, supra note 62, at 292.
104. I. (footnote omitted). "This phenomenon of 'government failure' parallels the
'market failure' that often gives rise to a regulatory scheme in the first instance." Id.
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D. EPA's Rulemaking Environment
EPA's rulemaking environment is a product of external pressures
from the three branches of the federal government as well as
numerous manifestations of the public interest. Internal reaction to
these varied influences is a principal focus of the literature on
regulatory delay.' °5 EPA's independence and authority have eroded
as resources have been used to achieve the goals of entities other than
the agency itself. As a result of pervasive statutory requirements and
increased judicial control, more than eighty percent of EPA's major
decisions are made by courts or in formal negotiated settlements.0 6
In addition, EPA officials, who spend ninety percent of their time in
courts and congressional hearings defending their actions, have little
time to contribute to making thoughtful, deliberative decisions."°7
Instead, they are forced to spend the remainder of their time
disproportionately on a few issues to satisfy the various supervising
bodies.1
0 8
The rulemaking goals of EPA managers have been reshaped in
reaction to this environment. Survival of review has become the
overarching management goal: "The job of EPA's managers is to
shepherd the rulemaking process along in an efficient way to produce
rules that will survive judicial and political review. " "°9 Moreover, the
prospects of surviving review and promulgating regulations in such an
atmosphere instill a pervasive hesitance in the process.
Each rulemaking is attended to by personnel from various offices
throughout EPA, and the goals of the individuals within a workgroup
are often divergent."0 Professor McGarity's survey of EPA employ-
ees' priorities revealed the wide variety of objectives among EPA
105. The Administrative Conference has recommended "Internal Agency Management
Initiatives" to expedite the rulemaking process: "Senior agency staff should develop
management strategies to set priorities and track agency rulemaking initiatives, to achieve
more rapid internal clearances of proposed and final rules, to develop reasoned analysis
and response to significant issues raised in public comments, to manage the rulemaking
file (and associated requests for access to it), and to use appropriate advisory or negotiated
rulemaking committees." ADMINIsTRATIVE CONFERENCE, supra note 52, at 8 (footnote
omitted).
106. Lazarus, supra note 78, at 355 (footnotes omitted).
107. 1&
108. Id
109. Thomas 0. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 57, 62 (Autumn 1991).
110. Id at 76-86.
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officers."' It demonstrated, for example, that timely promulgation
was significantly more important to the Program Office than to other
offices. 112 More importantly, Professor McGarity identified a strate-
gic use of the differing attitudes toward timeliness: because not all
offices must account internally for delays, some workgroup members
can use delay tactics to force concessions from other members."'
Furthermore, the general lack of direction that EPA has
experienced has detrimentally affected the confidence of agency
employees." 4 The constant pressure of deadlines and the inevitable
failure to meet them is demoralizing, and increased delay is often the
result.15 The personnel who grind through the rulemaking process
are generally dedicated to the agency's mission, but may at the same
time have conflicting personal objectives." 6  In addition, they
frequently decide to conduct "further study" resulting in further delay
because they know that any decision that EPA makes is likely to be
attacked by some interest group or government body."
7
IV. THE AGENDA'S ROLE IN AN EVOLVING BUREAUCRACY
The gross inaccuracy of Agenda progress estimates is significant
on two levels. First, it signals the existence of an unknown number
of problems and causes of delay in the administrative process.
Second, the absence of credibility undermines the fundamental
purpose of the Agenda-to facilitate public participation in the
rulemaking process.
Improving the system would demand a detailed understanding of
the problems and their causes. The complexity of contributing
factors and the current lack of primary data make these determina-
tions impossible. Some empirical analyses have attempted to correlate
delay with specific causes, but the results have been inconclusive."'
111. Id. The survey requested that employees "rank on a scale from one-to-ten the vigor
with which each office represented on the workgroup pursued each of the goals." Id. at
77. Ten agency goals were included in the survey: (1) timeliness; (2) administrative
efficiency; (3) scientific and technical credibility; (4) allocative efficiency; (5) fidelity to
statute; (6) judicial review; (7) political review; (8) enforceability; (9) fairness; and (10)
multimedia considerations. Id.
112. See id. at 78.
113. Id. at 79.
114. See Lazarus, supra note 78, at 350.
115. ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY, supra note 67, at 47.
116. See MASHAW, supra note 52, at 3 ("[AII the participants in the regulatory or
rulemaking process are boundedly rational and limitedly altruistic.").
117. See Percival, supra note 58, at 194.
118. See Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 4, at 130-33 (finding that an examination of EPA
rulemakings from 1986 through 1989 produced one statistical model that "confirmed"
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There is currently no adequate system in place to track regulations
through the tortuous rulemaking process. Certainly those who work
closely with the regulations can identify various factors affecting the
progress of each one, but such information has not been compiled.
Until these barriers are removed, the evolution of administrative
rulemaking cannot proceed.
A significant barrier to effective public participation in the
administrative process is the publication of unrealistic Agenda
information; "[t]imetables are useless if they are not realistic."" 9
While EPA could readily produce more realistic estimates, publishing
them would mean acknowledging in advance that some congressional
and judicial deadlines could not be met and that powerful interest
groups' favorite regulations would not get the attention sought. Yet,
the Agenda is currently the most comprehensive tracking system
available to the public. Its coverage of the entire range of regulatory
agencies gives it great potential to effect government-wide administra-
tive reform. But to reach its full potential, it will have to be trans-
formed into a credible source of information and accountability and
enhanced to provide the necessary details about the underlying causes
of delay.
A. The APA and Resistance to Administrative Disclosure
The original APA, together with the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),12° represents the cornerstone efforts to force greater
government accountability. Resistance to the FOIA's disclosure
requirements is strong, however, and case-by-case court struggles
continue to develop over individual rulemakings. Because adequate
disclosure of information on the causes of rulemaking delay is
unlikely under current law, congressional amendment of the FOIA or
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or modification of the Agenda's rule-
making reporting system by executive order is necessary.
Drafters of the APA were primarily concerned with "the usurpa-
tion of government by powerful private groups [and] the danger of
self-interested representation [leading to] the pursuit by political
actors of interests that diverge from those of the citizenry."121
suspicions of OMB causation of delay in rulemaking, but two models that showed no
significant effect).
119. Neil R. Eisner, Agency Delay in Informal Rulemaking, 3 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 7, 46
(1989).
120. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
121. Sunstein, supra note 62, at 271.
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Reducing these risks is still the main goal of administrative law. 2'
Information disclosure and public accountability are the most
effective methods to achieve that goal.
The FOIA was incorporated into the APA in 1967 to ensure
public access to government information.'23 Based on progressive
ideas regarding achieving government change through disclosure and
accountability, 2 4 it represented a broad leap in disclosure law. The
FOIA includes nine exemptions,1 25 which have been the focus of
years of litigation regarding the extent to which disclosure is
mandated.1 26 Resistance to disclosure has permeated the executive
branch and independent agencies. 27 The polarization of the envi-
ronmental debate further impedes information disclosure; 28 parties
including Congress, regulatees, environmentalists, and EPA often take
extreme positions, and the common strategy of making excessive
demands followed by public attacks for compromise serves to
discourage disclosure.1' 9
Executive implementation and judicial review of the FOIA reveal
the entrenched forces of resistance. Wolfe v. Department of Health and
Human Services,' for example, demonstrates the ongoing hand
wringing encountered in the FOIA jurisprudence. In Wolfe, the
122. Id. at 295.
123. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 215 (3d ed. 1988).
124. See id. at 215-17.
For the first time the individual was given a legally enforceable right of access to
government files and documents and one not limited to those needed for
litigation in an actual case. In this respect FOIA has made for a profound
alteration in the position of the citizen vis-a-vis government. No longer is the
individual seeking information from an agency in the position of a mere
suppliant.
Id Schwartz summarizes the policies behind the FOIA as follows:
-that disclosure be the general rule, not the exception;
-that all individuals have equal rights of access;
-that the burden be on the Government to justify the withholding of a
document, not on the person who requests it;
-that individuals improperly denied access to documents have a right to seek
injunctive relief in the courts; [and]
-that there be a change in Government policy and attitude.
Id. (citing RAMSEY CLARK, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON
THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, reprinted in
PIKE & FISCHER ADMIN. L.2D STAT. 203-04 (1967)).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1988).
126. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 123, at 217-23 (discussing cases stemming from
FOIA disclosure disputes).
127. See id.
128. Lazarus, supra note 78, at 354.
129. Id.
130. 839 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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plaintiffs sought information regarding the progress of FDA actions
through executive branch review by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and OMB. 5 ' The information had been
requested under the FOIA so the plaintiff could identify and
challenge the causes of delay. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of disclosure3 2 and a divided appellate panel
affirmed. 13  A rehearing en banc resulted in a reversal allowing
OMB to withhold the information," 4 but the court remained
divided. Writing for the majority, Judge Bork stated that "th [e] case
reflect[ed] dissatisfaction with the results of the development of
formal presidential oversight of executive branch rulemaking."3 5
The split of opinions and enthusiastic dissent written by the judges
reflect a more general split of opinion as to the need for further
disclosure. Legislation mandating further disclosure in the Agenda
would not be a radical departure from the current expectations of
many involved in the rulemaking process.
The rift between the majority and dissent stemmed from their
divergent beliefs regarding the degree to which government opera-
tions should be conducted in a "fishbowl" exposed to public scruti-
ny. 136 The disagreement regarded the interpretation of Exemption
5 of the FOIA, the executive or deliberative process privilege, which
prevents disclosure of "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency."137  The legislative history of
Exemption 5 reveals that it was enacted to ensure honest debate in
agency decisionmaking by insulating the process from public
scrutiny. 38  The court determined that the appropriateness of
131. Id at 769.
132. Wolfe v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 630 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1985).
133. Wolfe v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 815 F.2d 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
134. Wolfe v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en
banc).
135. Id. at 770. The plaintiffs wanted disclosure of which executive bodies were
reviewing the regulations and the length of time the regulations spent in each stage. Id
at 771. HHS disclosed only that it maintains a log containing the information sought. I&
136. Id. at 773. After the public relations disaster associated with the resignation of
Administrator Burford, EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus embraced the term "goldfish bowl"
to describe the way in which his agency would operate in order to regain public support.
Percival, supra note 58, at 168. Ruckelshaus also declared during his first term that broad
public participation would benefit the agency's efforts to win public support. Id.
137. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1988).
138. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965). The majority in Wolfe stated
that "Congress adopted Exemption 5 because it recognized that the quality of administra-
tive decision-making would be seriously undermined if agencies were forced to operate in
a fishbowl." Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 773 (citing Mead Data Cent. Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force,
542 [VOL. 53:521
REINVENTING THE REGULATORY AGENDA
disclosure thereby turns on whether the information sought reveals
"significant aspects of the deliberative process." 39
The decision in Wolfe shielded from public disclosure logs
indicating the length of time proposals spent at each stage of the
rulemaking process."' The majority maintained that such informa-
tion would not only identify where delay occurred, but provide clues
regarding how particular agencies or departments viewed rulemaking
proposals.' The dissenters maintained that information regarding
rulemaking timing does not necessarily reveal the political positions
contemplated because only a working title of the rule, not its exact
content, is known before publication.142 The dissenters maintained
that the FOIA's legislative history demands a narrow construction of
Exemption 5 and reasoned that, "[s]trictly construed, Exemption 5
would seem not to apply at all to a log that merely indicates receipt
or transmittal of proposals. It exempts only 'memoranda or letters,'
undoubtedly for the express purpose of limiting its privilege to
documents which divulge agency reasoning and conclusions. ""'
The dissenters additionally asserted that "[p] remature disclosure of
the agencies' tentative rationales and preliminary conclusions (and
factual materials to the extent that they inevitably reflect these
predecisional views) is the only ground for invoking Exemption
5 44
The majority's fundamental resistance to public accountability
was evident in its conclusion in dicta that "disclosure would force
officials to punch a public time clock."145 As noted in Judge
566 F.2d 242, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
139. Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 771 n.3.
140. Id at 771.
141. See id at 775. The majority reasoned that because a working summary of the
regulation was provided in the Agenda, id. at 771, any indication that an action was
delayed in a particular department's review process would suggest whether or not that
department supported the proposed action. Id at 775. But the dissent pointed out that
the rulemaking process is not so clear cut: "The majority assumes a rigidified, and
therefore predictable deliberation process that the record and the realities of government
decisionmaking do not support." Id. at 777 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 777-78 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 778 n.3 (Wald, C.J., dissenting). The majority used the legislative history to
support its position by noting that "[i]n accordance with the general disclosure policy of
FOIA, Exemption 5 is to be construed 'as narrowly as consistent with efficient Government
operation.'" Id at 773-74 (quoting S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965)). In
her dissenting opinion, however, Judge Ginsberg insisted that Congress intended
Exemption 5 to be narrowly construed and that the court's decision strayed from that
intent. Id at 780 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
144. Id at 779 (Wald, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
145. Id. at 776.
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Ginsberg's dissent, however, similar information regarding the current
status of the Internal Revenue Service's regulatory projects is
published. 46 No reason exists to assume that agencies would be
imperiled by disclosing similar information.
As in Wolfe, OMB's disclosure practices have often been the target
in struggles regarding interpretation of the FOIA. In 1986, OMB
enacted a disclosure policy1 47 that promised disclosure, after publica-
tion of the proposed final rule, of agency head correspondence, dates
of commencement and completion of review, and the drafts of
regulations sent to 0MB for review. 4' Information is available
under the policy only upon written request.149  The timing of its
release, its relative inaccessibility to the general public, and the fact
that OMB will not disclose information on rules that have not survived
review reduces the utility of the policy for the public. In effect, it has
amounted to little more than a weak step toward disclosure which
only momentarily pacified congressional critics.
Numerous recommendations for greater disclosure have been
written over the years. The debate over the disclosure of ex parte
contacts, which peaked in response to the actions of the Bush
Administration's Council on Competitiveness, has led to calls for
information disclosure amendments to the APA."5' In addition, the
Administrative Conference has recently recommended amendments
to "[e]nsure appropriate expedition, openness and transparency in
the review process." '5 To effect meaningful change, however, the
government must comprehensively address the entire rulemaking
process, not just executive review. Specifically, it must develop a
concrete method to measure and evaluate rulemaking performance
from start to finish.
B. Reinventing Government
The reform of rulemaking disclosure could be handled more
effectively by executive order than through congressional legislation.
146. 1& at 780 n.* (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). This information includes the names of
decisionmakers and reasons for the transmittal of each item. Id
147. Percival, supra note 58, at 171 n.259 (citing Memorandum from Wendy L. Gramm
(then OIRA administrator), Additional Procedures Concerning OIRA Reviews under
Executive Orders Nos. 12291 and 12498 (June 13, 1986)).
148. McGarity, supra note 55, at 1449.
149. I&
150. See Hearings (Part 2), supra note 63, at 293 (testimony of Prof. Cass R. Sunstein).
It is arguable that such disclosure must be made as the Act now reads. See id. at 292-93.
See also id. at 328 (testimony of Prof. Robert V. Percival).
151. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE, supra note 52, at 9.
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Moreover, Vice President Gore's "Reinventing Government" initia-
tive, 5  the National Performance Review, could propel the transfor-
mation of the Agenda into a powerful administration-wide regulatory
management tool. The National Performance Review could also
improve the credibility of the Agenda, as a more open rulemaking
environment-allowing for publication of more realistic
dates-evolves over time.
Improving the rulemaking process, however, will depend on the
development and use of effective measurement tools. These tools are
necessary for the federal government implementation of Total Quality
Management (TQM) theory, a quality improvement theory that
incorporates the systematic measurement of process to achieve greater
understanding of problems and develop effective solutions.5 ' The
National Performance Review has already incorporated many TQM
concepts into its vision of entrepreneurial government.
The concepts of TQM are not new to the government. In the
midst of the American industrial quality movement in 1988, the
United States Office of Personnel Management established the
Federal Quality Institute (FQI) to lead the government in adopting
the concepts of TQM.15 4  TQM promotes systematic continuous
improvement through innovative, worker-driven and customer-
oriented approaches. These approaches ultimately reweave the
priorities of an organization into a focused mission. FQI has
acknowledged that implementing TQM in the federal government is
a monumental task:
152. See supra note 5.
153. Total Quality Management is an approach to government that encourages
innovative management strategies by local, state and federal governments to produce
greater effectiveness. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT:
HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR xix (1993).
Numerous state and several federal agencies have established statistical quality control
programs as part of their TQM process with dramatic success. See id. at 160. The federal
government has endorsed these theories at the highest levels; an endorsement by President
Clinton graces the cover of Osborne and Gaebler's book, and coauthor Osborne is special
consultant to Vice President Gore's "Reinventing Government" task force.
The wide-spread emulation of the Japanese quality revolution by "progressive"
American industries in the 1980's has created a boom in the field of TQM consulting.
Variations of TQM theory are associated with the names of Deming, Juran, and Ishikawa,
among others, who have been proclaimed "gurus" in the field. See e.g., JERRY BOWLES &
JOSHUA HAMMOND, BEYOND QUALITY: How 50 WINNING COMPANIES USE CONTINUOUS
IMPROVEMENT (1991); W. EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF THE CRISIS (1986).
154. FEDERAL QUALITY INSTITUTE, FEDERAL TOTAL QUALrlY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK:
INTRODUCTION TO TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 34 (1991).
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In short, the government is a huge conglomerate of activities
and functions generally operating under inflexible and
outdated management practices and principles. The objec-
tives of the government-wide TQM effort are to break down
the rigidity and excess structure of the government and to
devise ways to enlist the energies and talents of the
workforce to meet the challenges of the Nation. 5
FQI recognizes three fundamental principles of TQM: (1) focusing
on achieving customer satisfaction; (2) seeking continuous improve-
ment; and (3) assuring full involvement of the entire workforce in
improving quality.5 6 Measurement and analysis are essential to the
pursuit of continuous improvement.15 7  Exhibit 1 illustrates FQI's
approach to reinventing government.
EXHIBIT I








Source: U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Federal Quality Institute.
155. 1d.
156. Id. at 3.
157. Id. at 8.
In order to assure that processes are continuously improved, data should be
collected and analyzed on a continuing basis, with particular attention to
variation in processes. The causes of variation are examined to determine
whether they result from special circumstances or from recurring or "common"
causes. Different strategies should be adopted to correct each occurrence. The
immediate objectives of the analysis and measurement effort are to reduce
rework, waste, and cycle-time and to improve cost-effectiveness and accuracy. The
ultimate objectives, of course, are to ensure that the organization understands the
extent to which customer satisfaction is being realized, where there are
deficiencies, and why, and to isolate causes that can be attacked systematically.
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The "Reinventing Government" initiative similarly recognizes the
value of measuring the process itself,58 but emphasizes the impor-
tance of measuring the results of the process.'59 Phrases that have
become dogma for TQM consultants are also employed in connection
with the "Reinventing Government" approach: "What gets measured
gets done,"1" and "If you don't measure results, you can't tell
success from failure." 1' The idea is based on the belief that the
information organizations receive through measurement of their work
can be used to transform them into more successful organiza-
tions. 61
The first report issued by the National Performance Review laid
the foundation for reshaping the federal government and identified
numerous strategies for innovative reform and specific cost cutting
measures. 163  It suggested changes to streamline regulatory re-
view" and identified as a goal the establishment of a "more useful
and realistic" review process.' 65 The National Performance Review,
however, relies too heavily on workload reduction and interagency
coordination to achieve its goals.166  A method of information
disclosure and accountability must be integrated into the reform plan
to measure agency processes and outcomes. There is currently too
little information about the rulemaking process to effect ambitious
reform without measurement tools to lead the way.
The fresh momentum and broad vision of the "Reinventing
Government" initiative is capable of driving to new levels the
evolution of administrative disclosure and accountability. When the
Agenda was shaped in the Regulatory Flexibility Act in 1980, Congress
intended to improve the effectiveness of federal regulation.' 67  It
sought to increase the accountability of regulatory agencies to their
158. The accuracy of the Agenda's estimated completion dates for rulemakings is an
example of a measurement of the rulemaking process.
159. The number of regulations generated by a given agency is an example of a
measurement of the outcome of the rulemaking process.
160. OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 153, at 146.
161. Id. at 147.
162. See id. at 146.
163. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 5.
164. Id. at 32-34.
165. Id. at 33.
166. See id at 33-34.
167. The legislative history states that "[t]he purpose of the Regulatory Flexibility Act
is to encourage Federal agencies to utilize innovative administrativeprocedures in dealing with
individuals, small businesses, small organizations, and small governmental bodies that
would otherwise be unnecessarily adversely affected by Federal regulations." S. REP. No.
878, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2788 (1980) (emphasis added).
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customers. The Agenda has failed to achieve this goal, and it awaits
transformation into a modern entrepreneurial government tool-a
measurement tool to chart the course of improvement. The creation
of a work environment allowing frank disclosure of the problems
underlying the administrative processes is essential. Whether or not
the ultimate goals of the National Performance Review are achieved,
the enhanced Agenda will help translate the numerous theories of
administrative inefficiency into workable solutions.
CONCLUSIONS
The empirical results of this Study demonstrate the shortcomings
of the Agenda and highlight the existence of chronic problems in the
rulemaking process. In its present form, the Agenda has become
little more than a semi-annual catalog of regulatory identification
numbers. It does not achieve its goal of serving as a notification tool
to enhance public participation in the rulemaking process. Such a
goal will inevitably remain unfulfilled so long as the document,
designed to be taken at face value, must be interpreted to reveal any
useful information.'"
Although regulatory delay has been the subject of numerous
theoretical and empirical studies, its causes remain unknown. The
reasons for delay are measurable, but government opposition to
disclosure has prevented raw data from being collected, forcing critics
of administrative practices to fill the data gaps with speculation. The
results of this Study merely identify the problems-rulemaking
progress estimates that are consistently and predictably inaccurate and
statutory deadlines that are routinely missed. This is only the first
step in creating workable solutions. The system is currently too
complex for piecemeal data collection through independent research
168. Professor Mashaw recognized the limited utility of the data in the Agenda for his
particular research:
Nor is it possible for the untutored eye to discern from the reporting in the
Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations whether activity levels are primarily in a
regulatory or deregulatory direction. The brief synopsis of the rule might well
be enough for a sophisticated observer, who fully understands the regulatory
status quo in a particular field to classify the rules with some degree of accuracy.
When I looked at three agencies with whose regulatory activities I am not
particularly familiar I found myself, in two of the three cases examined, unable
to classify the majority of the rules as either regulatory or deregulatory .... [I]t
obviously takes a specialist to interpret even the somewhat better data on
rulemaking that is included in the Regulatory Agenda than in the Federal
Register tallies.
MASHAW, supra note 52, at 15.
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to provide effective long-term solutions. Solutions will require
changes in disclosure law through legislation or executive order.
Despite its shortcomings, the Agenda is a reporting system that
can be efficiently redesigned into an effective quality management
tool. The rulemaking process must also be modified to require
accountability for various causes of delay as well as to require realistic
timetable estimates in each Agenda. A follow-through mechanism is
needed to address the causes of delay and design improvements to
the rulemaking system.
Among Professor Percival's recommendations for the reform of
executive oversight of EPA rulemaking are: (1) the reform of the
regulatory review process into a management tool to monitor EPA's
rulemaking progress and to ensure sufficient resources to meet its
agenda; and (2) the restructuring of regulatory review to provide
greater political accountability.'69  Modification of the Agenda
reporting requirements as a first step can efficiently create a manage-
ment tool that is effective at all stages of the regulatory lifecycle, while
also imposing accountability and increasing public oversight in the
spirit of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Reforms can create an
effective management tool only if they create a system that fosters
honest and accurate information. While accountability is essential to
obtaining meaningful data and understanding the system, the
information in the Agenda must be generated in an environment with
realistic expectations and without fear of reprisal when expectations
are not met.
By embracing the progressive "Reinventing Government"
initiative, the Clinton Administration has created high expectations of
progress. Concrete actions must be taken to begin fulfilling the
Administration's wide-ranging promises so as to reassure a wary
electorate. The administrative rulemaking system is well suited for
reform through adoption of quality management techniques and
entrepreneurial government. The recommended modifications to the
Regulatory Agenda can be made through Executive Order and can
provide an efficient, effective first step in the accomplishment of these
objectives. Alternatively, Congress, where rhetoric concerning greater
"public accountability" from administrative agencies is frequently
voiced, should amend the Freedom of Information Act and the
Regulatory Flexibility Act to unveil the rulemaking process so the
public can see what it really looks like.




EPA's Regulatory Agenda is divided into sections that correspond
to the statutes Congress has authorized EPA to implement. The
actions listed under each statute section are divided into four
subsections according to the progress of the rulemaking procedure.
The Prerule-Stage subsection includes all activities that EPA is
conducting to decide whether to initiate the APA rulemaking process,
such as advance notice of proposed rulemaking, advance studies, and
solicitation of public comment on the need for regulation. The Pro-
posed-Rule-Stage subsection includes the rulemakings that EPA has
decided to pursue and that have not yet resulted in publication of a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).1 The Final-Rule-Stage
subsection includes the rulemakings for which NPRMs have been
published and are progressing towards completion. The Completed-
Actions subsection includes rulemakings that are being removed from
the Agenda because they have been completed, withdrawn from
consideration, or combined with another rulemaking.
Exhibit 1 is taken from the April 27, 1992 Regulatory Agenda
Clean Air Act Proposed-Rule-Stage subsection. The action's previous
and subsequent Agenda entries can be located by reference to the
Regulatory Identification Number (RIN), the last item in the entry.
The RIN will remain with the action until it is withdrawn, completed,
merged with another rulemaking, or a notice of a change of RIN is
given in the Completed Actions subsection of a subsequent Agenda.
The RIN is the most effective way to identify a regulation because the
rulemaking's working title may change slightly or significantly over the
course of several Regulatory Agendas.
Several of the entries are responses to the requirements of
Congress or the Reagan Administration, which imposed greater
reporting requirements on certain regulations in the early 1980s.2
1. EPA states in its preface to the November 1992 Agenda, "EPA generally lists
regulations in this category of the agenda once they are within a year of proposal." 57
Fed. Reg. 52025 (1992).
2. See Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions from an
Empirical Study of EPA's Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521
(1994).
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"Significance" indicates whether the rulemaking is subject to the
requirement of Executive Order 12498 to include the agency's priority
actions in a yearly Regulatory Program. "Small Entities Affected" and
"Government Levels
Affected" entries
identify some of the
interests that EPA
anticipates will be

























of the action. The
"Legal Authority"
entry cites the statu-
tory provisions un-
der which EPA has
authority to promul-
gate the rule. A
"Legal Deadline"
entry is provided for
EXHIBIT 1
SAMPLE AGENDA ENTRY
3273. CONTROL OF AIR TOXICS
FROM MOTOR VEHICLES
Significance: Regulatory Program
Legal Authority- 42 USC 7545/CAA 211; 42
USC 7521/CAA 202
CFR Citation: 40 CFR 80; 40 CFR 86
Legal Deadline: Final, Statutory, May 15,
1995.
Abstract: The Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, require EPA to study the need for
and feasibility of controlling toxic air pollu-
tants associated with motor vehicles and
fuels. Based on this study, EPA must
promulgate standards containing reason-
able requirements to control such toxic
emissions, applying at a minimum to ben-
zene and formaldehyde.
Timetable:
Action Date FR Cite
NPRM 05/00/94
Final Action 05/00/95
Small Entities Affected: None
Government Levels Affected: None
Analysis: Regulatory Impact Analysis
Additional Information: SAN No. 2769.
FTS:8-374-8321.
Agency Contact: Joseph Somers, Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Air and Radia-
tion, 2565 Plymouth Road, Ann Arbor, MI
48105, 313 668-4321
RIN: 2060-AC75
-57 Fed. Reg. 17439 (1992)
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rulemakings that are subject to congressionally imposed statutory
deadlines,judicially imposed deadlines, or both. The "Timetable" lists
the EPA's "honest estimates" 3 of when the NPRM will be published
and when the Final Action (promulgation of the final rule) will be
completed. When an action has been completed, a Federal Register
citation is given.
I. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical study involved an examination of 164 rulemakings
that appeared in EPA's Regulatory Agenda, Clean Air Act section,
from October 1989 through November 1992.' Most of these
rulemakings were either initiated prior to the study period and
concluded during the study period, or initiated during the study
period and remained'in progress after the study period. Exhibit 2
provides a relative indication of the number of rulemakings in the
various subsections during each year.
EXHIBIT 2
RULEMAKINGS PER STAGE






Prerule Stage Proposed Rule Stage Final Rule Stage Completed Actions
'89 includes only actions listed in the October agenda.
'92 includes actions through the November agenda.
Note: The "Completed Actions" section lists all actions withdrawn, merged, and completed since
the preceeding Agenda.
3. 57 Fed. Reg. 57024 (1992).
4. The term "Rulemaking" in this study refers to informal APA rulemaking
procedures, including revisions of existing regulations. The term does not refer to the
development of guidelines, policy statements, and reviews of existing regulations.
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Twenty-four of the rulemakings were listed as new rulemakings
and progressed to completion during the study period. These rules
are the only complete data set of the
Regulatory Agenda lifecycle and provide an important perspective for
assessing the results for incomplete data subsets. But since it is
impossible to determine from an isolated Agenda which rulemakings
will be completed over a given period of time, this study looked
principally at the entire, undifferentiated population of rulemakings.
The goal was first to determine the reliability of the dates in the
Agenda timetables and, second, to identify which information in an
entry provided clues regarding the rulemaking's future progress.
A. Validity of Timetable Projections
This study was designed to help readers of the Agenda gauge the
credibility of the dates listed in the Agenda. Two main parameters
were chosen to measure the accuracy of EPA's performance projec-
tions and their reliability for planning purposes. "Slip" is a measure
of the length of time a revised projection has shifted, or slipped, into
the future relative to the date given in the previous Agenda. Each
estimate after the first one given for each rulemaking during the
study period was considered an opportunity for a slip. "Miss" applies
only to rulemakings for which a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) and/or a final rule was published. "Miss" refers to the
difference between an Agenda timetable estimate and the actual date
of publication (of either the NPRM or final rule). Subsequent
references to "NPRM" in this section refer to the date listed in the
timetable for publication of the NPRM. "FINAL" refers to the date
listed in the Agenda timetable for final action. There is frequently
more than one NPRM or FINAL for each rulemaking because EPA
may change the estimated NPRM or final rule publication dates in
every subsequent Agenda.
1. Proposed-Rule Stage.-The Proposed-Rule-Stage subsection of
the Agenda provides potentially important information for effective
participation in the regulatory process from the critical early stages.5
As Exhibit 2 displays, the vast majority of rulemakings under
consideration by EPA during the years examined in this study were in
5. The period before an NPRM appears in the Federal Register is a critical time
period. At this stage, the proposal is malleable. Accurate EPA progress projections are
important to persons intending either to contribute to the proposal or submit written
comments during the comment period following NPRM publication.
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the Proposed-Rule Stage, the period prior to publication of an
NPRM.
The following information describes the accuracy of the dates
provided in the Agenda timetable for entries in the Agenda's
Proposed-Rule-Stage subsection:
NPRM SLIP
* 81% (150 of 186) of all estimated NPRM publication dates
(NPRMs) slipped.
* 19% (36 of 186) did not slip.
* The estimated NPRMs slipped an average of 173 days (5.7
months) .6
NPRM MISS
" EPA failed to meet 86% of the NPRMs (72 of 84 NPRMs, 36 of
41 rulemakings had missed dates).
" EPA met 14% (12 of 84) of the NPRMs.
• EPA missed its estimated NPRMs by an average of 144 days (4.8
months).7
FINAL SLIP
* 64% (92 of 143) of estimated final rule publication dates
(FINALs) listed in the Proposed-Rule-Stage subsection slipped.
* 35% of the FINALs did not change.
* EPA moved up 1% of FINALs (but these dates subsequently
slipped further).
* The FINALs listed in the Proposed-Rule-Stage subsection of the
Agenda slipped an average of 217 days (7.2 months).'
FINAL MISS
o EPA failed to meet 82% (9 of 11) of the FINALs.
6. Standard deviation: 142 days; maximum: 1553 days; minimum: 32 days; median:
152 days.
7. Standard deviation: 130 days; maximum: 628 days; minimum: 29 days; median:
116 days.
8. Standard deviation: 157 days; maximum: 1249 days; minimum: 30 days; median:
183 days.
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" EPA met 18% (2 of 11) of the FINALs.
* EPA missed its FINALs listed in the Proposed-Rule-Stage
subsection of the Agenda by an average of 200 days (6.7
months) 9
2. Final-Rule Stage.-The Final-Rule-Stage subsection is of para-
mount importance for tracking the actual approval of environmental
regulations. The following information describes the accuracy of the
dates provided in the timetable for entries in the Agenda's Final-Rule-
Stage subsection:
FINAL SLIP
* 83% (52 of 63) of all FINALs slipped.
* 11% (7 of 63) of the FINALs did not slip.
* EPA moved up 6% (4 of 63) of the estimated dates.
* The FINALs listed in the Final-Rule-Stage subsection of the
Agenda slipped an average of 172 days (5.8 months) °
FINAL MISS
" EPA failed to meet 81% (38 of 47) of all FINALs in the Final-
Rule-Stage subsection of the Agenda. (One or more missed
FINAL was published for 22 of the 26 completed rulemakings.)
* EPA met 19% (9 of 47) of the FINALs.
* EPA missed its FINALs listed in the Final-Rule-Stage subsection
of the Agenda by an average of 114 days (3.8 months)."
Exhibit 3 summarizes the above information.
9. Standard deviation: 109 days; maximum: 321 days; minimum: 17 days; median:
109 days.
10. Standard deviation: 112 days; maximum: 517 days; minimum: 31 days; median:
153 days.





SUMMARY OF STUDY RESULTS FOR ALL RULEMAKINGS
NPRM FINAL RULE
Stage
Slipped Missed Slipped Missed
Proposed Rule 81% 86% 64% 82%
Stage (173 Day (144 Day (217 Day (200 Day
Average) Average) Average) Average)
Final Rule 83% 81%
Stage (172 Day (114 Day
Average) Average)
Both Stages 70% 81%
Combined (201 Day (130 Day
Average) Average)
3. Withdrawn and Completed Actions.-The likelihood that a
rulemaking will be withdrawn is another significant consideration in
evaluating the reliability of information in the Agenda. Exhibit 4
demonstrates that in recent years, withdrawal and merger of rules
have significantly outpaced the completion of rulemakings.
EXHIBIT4
RULEMAKINGS COMPLETED ANDWITHDRAWN PER YEAR







'89 includes only actions listed in the October agenda.
'92 includes actions through the November agenda.
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Thirty-five rulemakings, 21% of all rulemakings in the study, were
deleted from the Agenda without completion during the study. These
included rules that were labeled as "withdrawn" as well as rulemakings
that were "merged" into other rulemakings.
Withdrawn: 26 out of 35 actions, 16% of total rulemakings
studied.
Merged: 9 out of 35 actions, 5% of total rulemakings studied.
Total Deleted: 35 actions, 21% of total rulemakings studied.
Of the withdrawn rules with projected completion dates in the
timetable, three were overdue and two were withdrawn before
becoming overdue. Eight of the merged rules were merged before
the estimated completion date and only one was merged after. Four
were merged shortly before expiration of a CAAA statutory deadline
imposed by the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA).
These results may reflect strategic behavior on the part of EPA as
rules are merged or withdrawn to obscure the passing of statutory
deadlines. The re-evaluation of the necessity of a separate rulemaking
may come into sharper focus as the pressure of an impending
deadline increases. OMB review is a source of at least some of the
momentum for withdrawal of rulemakings. In 1989, 5% of all of the
regulations submitted to OMB review were subsequently withdrawn by
EPA. 2 Often regulations are neither promulgated nor formally
withdrawn, but languish for years in "regulatory purgatory."13
Exhibit 5 reflects a logical result; rules are most vulnerable to
being deleted from the Agenda in the Proposed-Rule- Stage subsec-
tion, before an NPRM has been published. Still, despite the time and
resources necessary to publish NPRMs, a significant 23% of the
deleted rulemakings (5% of the total actions studied) were deleted in
the Final-Rule Stage. The slow pace of the rulemaking process may
contribute to this seemingly wasteful practice-rules may simply
become obsolete during the rulemaking process.
12. Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 163 (Autumn 1991).
13. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying' the Rulemaking Process, 41




NUMBER OF RULES DELETED BY STAGE
Number % of % of
Stage Deleted Deleted Total
Prerule 3 8.57% 1.83%
Proposed Rule 21 60% 12.8%
Final Rule 8 22.86% 4.88%
Entered in Agenda as
Withdrawn* 3 8.57% 1.83%
All Stages 35 100% 21.34%
Total Rulemakings 164 100%
* These are rulemakings that EPA considered, but decided against pursuing during the six-
month period between two printings of the Agenda.
4. Meaning of "00/00/00. "-The designation "00/00/00"
frequently appears in the Agenda timetable as the projected date of
NPRM and FINAL publication. In fact, it was listed as an NPRM or
FINAL estimate at least once for 32% of the study population (52 of
164 rulemakings). The symbol is sometimes used in other contexts
to flag actions demanding immediate attention. However, EPA
apparently uses the symbol to indicate a strong likelihood that an
action will be delayed and/or withdrawn, or when a reasonable
estimate cannot be given.15 Readers unfamiliar with the Agenda
must be aware of this distinction.
Twenty-one rulemakings in the study had at least one "00/00/00"
entry in the NPRM column of the timetable.16 Forty-three percent
of those rulemakings (9 of 21) were subsequently withdrawn. Nine of
the remaining rulemakings stayed in the Proposed-Rule Stage with no
progress (i.e., publication of an NPRM) during the study period. Two
progressed from Prerule to Proposed-Rule Stage, and one progressed
from Proposed-Rule to Final-Rule Stage. In addition, "00/00/00"
entries appeared in an average of three consecutive Agendas before
a projected date was finally listed in the timetable. For the nine
14. Rulemakings for which no FINAL estimate was provided are included in the
description "00/00/00". There were 17 such rules.
15. No definition of the term is given in the Agenda.
16. These rulemakings were given no FINAL estimate or listed "00/00/00" as the
FINAL estimate.
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withdrawn rulemakings and the one which resulted in a published
NPRM, an average of 532 days (median of 510) passed between the
initial listing of "00/00/00" and any action on the rulemaking. The
publication of the NPRM occurred 723 days (twenty-four months)
after the publication of the first "00/00/00" entry.
Thirty-two rulemakings in the study showed a listing of
"00/00/00" only as a FINAL timetable entry. Thirty-four percent of
the total (11 of 32) were eventually withdrawn. However, 47% (7 of
15) of those that were already in the Final-Rule Stage were withdrawn,
compared to 43% for NPRMs and 21% for the entire study popula-
tion. A "00/00/00" entry in the Final-Rule Stage is thus probably a
sign of serious problems with the rulemaking.
Only five of the rulemakings did not progress during the study.
EPA published nine final rules and seven NPRMs. EPA averaged
three Agendas before producing FINAL estimates for all "00/00/00"
rulemakings. For the actions deleted from the Agenda, an average of
671 days (median of 510) passed between the publication of the first
FINAL "00/00/00" listing and any action. A screening of the
rulemakings, excluding those withdrawn, indicated that an average of
808 days (median of 776, maximum of 2402) passed between the first
appearance of "00/00/00" and the publication of a final rule.
These results demonstrate a pervasive problem in the rulemaking
process-defensive behavior by EPA leads to insufficient disclosure of
information. The data may be interpreted in two ways. EPA may be
using the "00/00/00" symbol as a euphemism for troubled rule-
makings, but a more critical reading of the data indicates that EPA is
intentionally using "00/00/00" entries to obscure the true status of
certain rulemakings. By not estimating an honest date, EPA is forcing
interested parties to work for the truth.
B. Compliance with Legal Deadlines
A legal deadline designation in the Regulatory Agenda gives
timetable estimates an undeserved air of authenticity. Statutory
deadlines were extremely popular with Congress when it enacted the
Clean Air Act Amendments, and the trend indicates that Congress will
continue to rely on them heavily in the future. But as this analysis
demonstrates, it is necessary to pause and assess the true value of
these deadlines if they are to be effectively used in future legislation.
Although this study is not a substantive analysis of the deadlines in the
study population, the empirical results indicate that deadlines have
not improved the reliability of Agenda timetable estimates.
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1. Statutory Deadlines.--A "Statutory Deadline" designation in an
Agenda entry connotes legal accountability for meeting the given
dates and further suggests that they are capable of being met. But the
sheer number of deadlines in the current Agenda creates doubts as
to that possibility. The results of this study reinforce those doubts.
A total of 72 rulemakings (44% of the study population) was
subject to statutory deadlines, and the CAAA imposed 85% (61 out of
72) of them. 17 The estimates in the Agenda timetable were only
slightly more reliable for statutory deadline rulemakings than for the
population as a whole for dates listed in the Proposed-Rule-Stage
subsection:
NPRM SLIP
* 70% (71 of 101) of the estimated NPRM publication dates
(NPRMs) for rulemakings subject to statutory deadlines slipped,
compared to 81% of the population as a whole.
* The NPRMs for rulemakings with statutory deadlines slipped an




* EPA failed to meet 85% (41 of 48) of the NPRMs for rule-
makings subject to statutory deadlines, compared to 86% for
the population as a whole.
" EPA missed its NPRMs for rulemakings with statutory deadlines
by an average of 150 days, compared to 144 days for the
population as a whole. 9
The study indicated, however, that FINALs for statutory deadline
rulemakings slipped less often than for the population as a whole:2"
17. Eight of the CAAA deadlines were imposed on existing rulemakings.
18. Standard deviation: 180 days; maximum: 1553 days; minimum: 31 days; median:
152 days.
19. Standard deviation: 130 days; maximum: 599 days; minimum: 10 days; median:
116 days.
20. These figures represent all FINALs, whether listed in the Proposed Rule Stage or
the Final Rule Stage.
560 [VOL. 53:521
REINVENTING THE REGULATORY AGENDA
FINAL SLIP
* 52% (82 of 157) of estimated final rule publication dates
(FINALs) for rulemakings subject to statutory deadlines
slipped, compared to 70% for the population as a whole.
* The FINALs for rulemakings subject to statutory deadlines
slipped an average of 233 days, compared to 201 days for the
population as a whole1.
2
FINAL MISS
* EPA failed to meet 95% (21 of 22) of the FINALs for the
rulemakings subject to statutory deadlines, compared to 81%
for the population as a whole.
" EPA missed its FINALs for rulemakings subject to statutory
deadlines by an average of 165 days, compared to 130 days for
the population as a whole.22
Exhibit 6 summarizes the data collected on rulemakings subject to
statutory deadlines.
EXHIBIT 6
SUMMARY OF STUDY RESULTS FOR RULEMAKINGS SUBJECT TO
STATUTORY DEADLINES
Stage
Stage NPRM FINAL RULE
Slipped Missed Slipped Missed
Proposed Rule 70% 85%
Stage (174 Day (150 Day
_ 7Average) Average)
Proposed & 52% 95%




21. Standard deviation: 171 days; maximum: 1249 days; minimum:
189 days.




Although FINAL projections for rulemakings with statutory
deadlines slipped slightly less often than the population as a whole,
they slipped further when they did, possibly indicating a reluctance on
the part of EPA to project realistic completion dates for rulemakings
with statutory deadlines. In short, EPA seems to want to avoid
admitting in advance that statutory deadlines may be missed. The
larger percentage of missed FINALs and the length of missed FINALs
further supports this inference. Apparently, EPA routinely retains
dates approximating the statutory deadlines longer than warranted.
As a result, the ultimate publication dates are further away from the
artificially optimistic projections.
A statutory deadline, however, apparently provides a relatively
strong assurance that the proceeding will not be abandoned. Only
nine of the 72 rulemakings subject to statutory deadlines were deleted
from the Agenda before completion. Of those nine, only two were
withdrawn outright.2 Four merged with other rulemakings shortly
before their statutory deadlines were set to expire, presumably
prompted by the approaching deadline. In one case, EPA decided to
issue a guidance rather than promulgate a rule. In the two other
cases, EPA decided to abandon promulgating New Source Perfor-
mance Standards in favor of establishing National Emissions Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants for organic solvent degreasing and
perchloroethylene dry cleaning. Regardless of the particular course
of action chosen by EPA, its timing appears to have been influenced
by the approaching deadline.
2. Judicial Deadlines.-Nine rulemakings, 5.5% of the study
population, were subject to judicial deadlines. Only three progressed
from Proposed-Rule to Final-Rule Stage. The results for the Pro-
posed-Rule Stage of this statistically small subgroup were surprisingly
similar to the Slip and Miss measures for the population as a whole:
NPRM SLIP
* 80% (4 of 5) of the estimated NPRM publication dates
(NPRMs) for rulemakings subject to judicial deadlines slipped,
compared to 81% for the population as a whole.
23. These two exceptions were not CAAA rulemakings.
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* The NPRMs for rulemakings with judicial deadlines slipped an
average of 182 days, compared to 173 days for the population
as a whole.24
NPRM MIss
" EPA failed to meet 83% (5 of 6) of the NPRMs for rulemakings
subject to judicial deadlines, compared to 86% for the popula-
tion as a whole.
" EPA missed its NPRMs for rulemakings subject to judicial
deadlines by an average of 20 days, compared to 144 days for
the population as a whole. 5
The smaller average miss forjudicial deadlines as opposed to statutory
deadlines suggests that EPA gives rulemakings with judicial deadlines
special attention, but deadlines are not guarantees that a date will be
met.
The FINAL results indicate that more of this attention is given as
the judicially imposed final deadline approaches (six rules went from
Final-Rule Stage to completion):
FINAL SLIP
* 10% (1 of 10) of the estimated final-rule publication dates
(FINALs) for rulemakings subject to judicial deadlines slipped,
compared to 70% for the population as a whole.
* The FINALs for rulemakings subject to judicial deadlines
slipped an average of 214 days, compared to 201 days for the
population as a whole.
FINAL MISS
* EPA failed to meet 50% (5 of 10) of the FINALS for rule-
makings subject to judicial deadlines, compared to 81% for the
population as a whole.
24. Standard deviation: 117 days; maximum: 330 days; minimum: 61 days; median:
168 days.




* EPA missed its FINALS for rulemakings with judicial deadlines
by an average of 85 days, compared to 130 days for the
population as a whole. 6
Exhibit 7 summarizes the data collected on rulemakings subject to
judicial deadlines.
EXHIBIT 7
SUMMARY OF STUDY RESULTS FOR RULEMAKINGS SUBJECT TO
JUDICIAL DEADLINES
NPRM FINAL RULEStage
Slipped Missed Slipped Missed
Proposed Rule 80% 
83%
Stage (182 Day (20 Day
Average) Average)
Final Rule 10% 50%
Stage (214 Day (85 Day
Average) Average)
Although this small sample size does not allow for accurate
comparisons, the implications are rational. The FINAL projection,
under more intense EPA management scrutiny, is apparently not
permitted to slip as the judicial deadline approaches, even when it is
inevitable that the deadline will be missed. Frequency and length of
Miss for judicial deadlines are much lower than for either the
statutory deadline subgroup or the population as a whole. These
results correspond with the Environmental and Energy Study Institute
(EESI) finding that "[c]ourt ordered deadlines are more effective
than statutory deadlines in speeding EPA action and setting priori-
ties."27 Perhaps the significantly higher median/lower average Miss
combination means that only more serious factors will force a missed
judicial deadline.
26. Standard deviation: 94 days; maximum: 252 days; minimum: 42 days; median:
227 days.
27. ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY STUDY, INSTITUTE AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INSTITUTE, STATUTORY DEADLINES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION: NECESSARY BUT NEED
IMPROVEMENT 24 (1985).
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C. Rulemakings Begun & Completed During the Study
Twenty-four rulemakings began and were cleared off the Agenda
during the study's time frame: EPA published 11 of the 24 as final
rules and deleted 13. Exhibit 8 summarizes the disposition of the 24
rules cleared off of the Agenda during the study period.
EXHIBIT 8
DISPosITION OF RULEMAKINGS CLEARED OFF THE AGENDA
FROM OCTOBER 1989 THROUGH NOVEMBER 1992
# of
Disposition Rulemakings % of 24
Total Rules Deleted 13 54.17%
Withdrawn 5 20.83%
Merged 8 33.33%
Total Final Rules Published 11 45.83%
Exhibit 9 compares the number of days that EPA estimated in the
rule's first Agenda entry it would take to publish an NPRM to the
number of days that it actually took. The exhibit shows the average,
maximum, and minimum number of days for both the actual and
estimated publication dates.
EXHIBIT 9
TIME FROM NPRM PUBLICATION TO FINAL RULE PUBLICATION
First Agenda
Published Final Rules Estimate Actual % Over
Average 198 days 305 days 54%
Maximum 321 days 438 days
Minimum 85 days 174 days
Standard Deviation 66 days 90 days
Exhibit 10 shows the length of time from the date of the first
Agenda to list a rule to the date the final rule was actually published.
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This is compared to the amount of time EPA first estimated it would
take from the first entry in the Agenda to final publication.
EXHIBIT 10
TIME FROM DATE OF FIRST AGENDA TO FINAL RULE PUBLICATION
EPA's First
Published Final Rules Estimate Actual % Over
Average 215 days 322 days 50%
Maximum 495 days 800 days
Minimum 39 days 44 days
Standard Deviation 110 days 222 days
Exhibit 11 documents the average, maximum, and minimum
number of days between EPA's first estimated final rule publication
dates and the actual final rule publication dates.
EXHIBIT 11
NUMBER OF DAYS BETWEEN THE FIRST ESTIMATED
FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE AND THE
ACTUAL PUBLICATION DATE






* EPA published this rule ahead of schedule.
Exhibit 12 compares EPA's first estimate of the number of days
it would take to publish an NPRM to the number of days that it
actually took.
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EXHIBIT 12
TIME FROM DATE OF FIRST AGENDA ENTRY TO NPRM PUBLICATION
EPA's First
Published NPRMs Estimate Actual % Over
Average 47 days 113 days 140%
Maximum 221 days 496 days
Minimum* 2 days -34 days
Standard Deviation 73 days 164 days
* NPRM was actually published ahead of schedule and before the Agenda was published.
Exhibit 13 documents the average, maximum, and minimum
number of days between EPA's first estimated NPRM publication date
and the actual NPRM publication date.
EXHIBIT 13
NUMBER OF DAYS BETWEEN THE FIRST ESTIMATED







* EPA published this rule ahead of schedule.
D. Performance Statistics for Additional Subgroups
1. Clean Air Act Amendments.-The results of the analysis of
rulemakings subject to deadlines were not unpredictable. In 1985, an
exhaustive study by the Environmental and Energy Study Institute
recognized the swelling tide of congressional use of statutory
deadlines in environmental legislation."8 The study demonstrated
28. See generally id.
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the need for better use of deadlines as a legislative tool.29  It
suggested that Congress set more realistic deadlines"0 and impose
them only on the most important tasks.3 1 The fact that 85% (61 Out
of 72) of the statutory deadlines in this study's population were
imposed by the CAAA, and 68% (61 out of 90) of all rulemakings
citing the CAAA as authority had deadlines attached, suggests a
continued wholesale use of statutory deadlines as a legislative tool.
Moreover, the unreliability of Agenda timetable dates suggests that
greater accountability and expedited rulemaking will not soon be
achieved.1
2
The CAAA requirements created a sudden and dramatic shift in
EPA rulemaking priorities. Exhibit 14 illustrates the increase in
workload.
EXHIBIT 14
INFLUENCE OF THE 1990 AMENDMENTS ON THE
REGULATORY AGENDA WORKLOAD





Fall '89 Spring '90 Fall 90 I Spring '91 Fall '91 Spring '92
Clean Air Act Amendments (11/15/90)
Note: The "Completed Actions" section lists all actions withdrawn, merged, and completed since the
preceeding Agenda.
Exhibit 15 suggests the shifting focus as EPA completed fewer
rules and withdrew or merged more rulemakings.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 58.
31. Id. at 57.
32. Congressional displeasure with the implementation of the CAAA has been voiced
emphatically in congressional subcommittees and the federal courts. See, e.g., Clean Air Act
Implementation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Waxman v. Reilly, No. 92-1320 HHG,
slip op. (D.D.C. 1992) (consent decree issued in a suit brought by Representative Henry
Waxman for failure to meet CAAA deadlines).
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EXHIBIT 15
INFLUENCE OF 1990 AMENDMENTS ON THENUMBER OF
RULEMAKINGS COMPLETED ANDWITHDRAWN






Fall '89 Spring '90 Fall '90 Spring '91 Fall '91 Spring '92 Fall '92
Clean Air Acts Amendments (11/15/90)
The 90 rulemakings citing the CAAA in this study were analyzed
using the same parameters as the total study population. Because
eighteen of those rulemakings were already on EPA's Agenda before
the November 1990 amendments, only dates that appeared in the
April '91 Agenda through the November '92 Agenda were included
in the study. The estimates in the timetable were no more reliable
for the CAAA rulemakings than for the population as a whole, with
the exception of NPRM misses, which were shorter.
NPRM SLIP
* 79% (92 of 116) of the estimated NPRM publication dates
(NPRMs) for CAAA-required rulemakings slipped, compared to
81% for the population as a whole.
* The NPRMs for CAAA-required rulemakings slipped an average
of 179 days, compared to 173 days for the population as a
whole.33
NPRM MISS
* EPA failed to meet 85% (35 of 41) of the.NPRMs for CAAA-
required rulemakings that progressed from Proposed-Rule to
33. Standard deviation: 166 days; maximum: 1553 days; minimum: 31 days; median:
153 days.
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Final-Rule Stage, compared to 86% for the population as a
whole.
* EPA missed its NPRMs for CAAA-required rulemakings by an
average of 109 days, compared to 144 days for the population
as a whole. 4
FINAL performance was slightly less reliable for CAAA rulemakings
than for the entire population:
FINAL SLIP
* 58% (99 of 171) of the estimated final rule publication dates
(FINALs) for CAAA-required rulemakings slipped, compared
to 70% for the population as a whole.
* The FINALs for CAAA-required rulemakings slipped an average
of 212 days, compared to 201 days for the population as a
whole.
FINAL MIss
* EPA failed to meet 95% of the FINALs for the CAAA-required
rulemakings, compared to 81% for the population as a whole.
" EPA missed its FINALs for CAAA-required rulemakings by an
average of 135 days, compared to 130 days for the population
as a whole. 5
Exhibit 16 summarizes the data collected on CAAA rulemakings.
34. Standard deviation: 86 days; maximum: 425 days; minimum: 9 days; median: 95
days.
35. Standard deviation: 96 days; maximum: 275 days; minimum: 5 days; median: 137
days.
570 [VOL. 53:521
REINVENTING THE REGULATORY AGENDA
EXHIBIT 16
SUMMARY OF STUDY RESULTS FOR CAAA-REQUIRED RULEMAKINGS
NPRM FINAL RULE
Stage
Slipped Missed Slipped Missed
Proposed Rule 79% 85%
Stage (179 Day (109 Day
Average) Average)
Proposed & 58% 95%
Final (212 Day (135 Day
Combined Average) Average)
2. Executive Order/Regulatory Flexibility Act Requirements.-
a. Small Entities Affected.-The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires
that EPA provide notice to small entities when a proposed regulation
might significantly impact them.36  Rulemakings designated as
possibly affecting small entities accounted for 57% of the study
population. This is not surprising, since the Agenda was created out
of concern for protecting the interests of small businesses. Except
for differences in the publication of final rules, the small entities
designation did not appear to affect the reliability of the estimates in
the timetable. Exhibit 17 contains a breakdown of the rulemakings
that affect small entities according to the type of small entity affected.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 602(c).




NUMBER OF RULEMAKINGS THAT AFFECT SMALL ENTrrIES
# of % of
Type of Small Entity Affected Rulemakings Study
Businesses (B) 30 18.29%
Governmental Jurisdiction (GJ) 7 4.27%
Organizations (0), GJ, B 4 2.44%
B, GJ •3 1.83%
B, 0 1 0.61%
Total # of Rulemakings
Affecting Small Entities 45 27.44%
? (Undecided whether
the rulemakings affect
small entities) 49 29.88%
None (Rulemakings not
affecting small entities) 70 42.68%
Total Rulemakings 164 100%
The following summary of data compares rulemakings in the
Agenda designated as affecting specific small entities, rulemakings
designated as not affecting small entities (nones), and the population
of rulemakings as a whole.
For dates listed in the Proposed-Rule-Stage subsection:
NPRM SLIP
* 79% (98 of 124) of the estimated NPRM publication dates
(NPRMs) for rulemakings affecting small entities slipped,
compared to 83% of the rulemakings not affecting small
entities, and 81% of the population as a whole.
* The NPRMs for rulemakings affecting small entities slipped an
average of 179 days, compared to an average of 162 days for
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rulemakings not affecting small entities, and 173 days for the
population as a whole.3 8
NPRM Miss
* EPA failed to meet 88% (44 of 50) of the NPRMs for rule-
makings affecting small entities by their estimated publication
dates, compared to 82% for the rulemakings not affecting small
entities, and 86% for the population as a whole.
" EPA missed its NPRMs for rulemakings affecting small entities
by an average of 149 days, compared to 168 days for rule-
makings not affecting small entities, and 144 days for the
population as a whole. 9
FINAL performance for both Stages combined:
FINAL SLIP
* 59% (103 of 176) of the estimated final rule publication dates
(FINALs) for rulemakings affecting small entities slipped,
compared to 62% (44 of 71) for rulemakings not affecting
small entities, and 70% for the population as a whole.
* The FINALs for rulemakings affecting small entities slipped an
average of 212 days, compared to average slips of 192 days for
rules not affecting small entities, and 201 days for the popula-
tion as a whole.'
FINAL Miss
" EPA failed to meet 88% (23 of 26) of the FINALs for rule-
makings affecting small entities, compared to 78% (21 of 27)
for rulemakings not affecting small entities, and 81% for the
population as a whole.
* EPA missed its FINALs for rulemakings affecting small entities
by an average of 160 days, compared to 105 days for rules not
38. Standard deviation: 163 days; maximum: 1553 days; minimum: 31 days; median:
153 days.
39. Standard deviation: 133 days; maximum: 599 days; minimum: I day; median:
117 days.




affecting small entities, and 130 days for the population as a
whole.4'
Exhibit 18 summarizes the data collected on rulemakings affecting
small entities.
EXHIBIT 18




Slipped Missed Slipped Missed
Proposed Rule 79% 88%
Stage (179 Day (149 DayAverage) Average)
Proposed & 59% 88%
Final (212 Day (160 Day
Combined Average) Average)
The FINAL projections for rulemakings not affecting small
entities (43% of the population) were met 10% more often than small
entity rulemakings and were closer to the actual completion dates.
The additional delay accompanying small entity rulemakings might
result from the extra administrative requirements for such rule-
makings or awareness of the expected effects on small entities.
b. Analysis Requirements.-It was anticipated prior to this study
that the requirement to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA)
or a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (RFA) would affect the reliability
of the time estimates, but no effect was observed.
For dates listed in the Proposed-Rule-Stage subsection:
41. Standard deviation: 138 days; maximum: 517 days; minimum: 5 days; median:
152 days.
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NPRM SLIP
* 70% (33 of 47) of the estimated NPRM publication dates
(NPRMs) for rulemakings subject to analysis requirements
slipped, compared with 81% for the population as a whole.
* The NPRMs for rulemakings subject to analysis requirements
slipped an average of 165 days, compared with 173 for the
population as a whole.4"
NPRM Miss
" EPA failed to meet 81% (25 of 31) of the NPRMs for rule-
makings subject to analysis requirements that progressed from
Proposed-Rule to Final-Rule Stage, compared with 86% for the
population as a whole.
" EPA missed its NPRMs for rulemakings subject to analysis
requirements by an average of 125 days (94 median), com-
pared with 144 for the population as a whole.43
" Eighteen proposed rules were ultimately published.
FINAL performance for both Stages combined:
FINAL SLIP
* 48% (34 of 71) of the estimated final rule publication dates
(FINALs) for rulemakings subject to analysis requirements
slipped, compared with 70% for the population as a whole.
* The FINALs for rulemakings subject to analysis requirements
slipped an average of 242 days, compared with 201 for the
population as a whole.
FINAL MISS
* EPA failed to meet 83% (15 of 18) of the FINALs for rule-
makings subject to analysis requirements, compared with 81%
for the population as a whole.
42. Standard deviation: 197 days; maximum: 1187 days; minimum: 60 days; median:
121 days.




" EPA missed its FINALs for rulemakings subject to analysis
requirements by an average of 163 days, compared with 130 for
the population as a whole."
" Seven final rules were ultimately published.
Exhibit 19 summarizes the data collected on rulemakings requiring
RIAs or RFAs.
EXHIBIT 19




Slipped Missed Slipped Missed
Proposed Rule 70% 81%
Stage (165 Day (125 Day
Average) Average)
Proposed & 48% 83%
Final (242 Day (163 Day
Combined Average) Average)
44. Standard deviation: 106 days; maximum: 321 days; minimum: 17 days; median:
152 days.
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